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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1  
Amici Peter Conti-Brown, Adam Levitin, and Patri-
cia McCoy—three leading scholars of financial regula-
tion—submit this brief to lend their expertise on the 
history and purpose of the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau’s structure. They take no position on the 
question of severability. Their affiliations are listed in 
the appendix. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Framers of the Constitution did not include a 
detailed list of administrative design features that would 
pass constitutional muster. Instead, the Constitution left 
those details for Congress to consider—an invitation that 
the legislature accepted with relish. In the subsequent 
230 years, Congress has experimented with a wide varie-
ty of institutional design features that matched the poli-
tics of the enacting coalition with the policy goals it 
sought to accomplish.  
Congress’s authority to experiment is not unlimited. 
The Court has previously identified certain principles 
that shape the boundaries of constitutionally acceptable 
agency structure. The touchstone principle for agency 
design is “accountability,” because the authority that 
agencies exercise—be it executive, legislative, or adjudi-
cative—is derivative of the three branches of govern-
ment.  
 
1 This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for a 
party and no one other than amici curiae and their counsel made a 
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
Both parties have consented to the filing of this brief; letters of 
consent have been lodged with the Clerk.  
 -2- 
 With those principles in mind, Congress has contin-
uously experimented with the design of administrative 
agencies, sometimes learning from past disappoint-
ments, sometimes adapting features to the particular 
policy concerns at hand. It is an ongoing and iterative 
process; as a result, there is no single paradigmatic 
agency. Instead, different agencies achieve sufficient 
accountability through various combinations of features. 
Petitioner seeks to petrify the administrative state 
by requiring agencies to conform to one of two para-
digms: Either the head of the agency must be removable 
at will by the President or the agency must be structured 
as a multimember commission. But there is no basis to 
believe that commissions foster accountability. This 
wooden one-or-the-other requirement has no connection 
to either the constitutional text or the principle of ac-
countability.    
Accountability must be analyzed holistically, on the 
sum of an agency’s features, and not merely on removal 
status or the number of Senate-confirmed appointees. 
Viewed holistically, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) is a highly accountable agency, designed 
to be insulated both from (1) specific kinds of political 
manipulations that Congress has deemed harmful to its 
policy goals and (2) “regulatory capture,” or the concern 
that regulators become mere instruments of industry 
rather than the government. The CFPB boasts a new 
combination of agency features that reflect both Con-
gress’s concern about regulatory capture undermining 
agency accountability and a longstanding concern about 
the particular dangers that flow from direct presidential 
control over financial regulatory policy.  
The CFPB’s structure is a permissible example of 
how Congress—learning from what works in regulatory 
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agencies—can design a system that enhances rather 
than diminishes accountability. To the extent that this 
case raises separation-of-powers concerns, it is through 
Petitioner’s invitation to this Court to usurp Congress’s 
role as the Constitution’s chief designer of the institu-
tions of government. Petitioner’s request would calcify 
the acceptable set of agency designs and assign to the 
Court the never-ending role of evaluating every facet of 
congressional experimentation any time a regulator 
reached a conclusion that a regulated entity opposed. 
The Court must reject Petitioner’s invitation.  
The present lack of controversy exposes some of the 
risks of doing otherwise. The President has not attempt-
ed to remove the CFPB Director. There is no record 
before the Court about what such a removal attempt 
would look like and whether Congress’s requirement of 
“cause” before the President could do so breaches consti-
tutional limits. As Judge Griffith’s concurring opinion in 
a related case indicates, there is no consensus about 
what “cause[]” even means. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 
F.3d 75, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Griffith, J., con-
curring). Because of this uncertainty, this Court should 
dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted and await a 
genuine controversy regarding the limits of for-cause 
removability.  
Should the Court not dismiss the case, there are two 
alternatives that will respect Congress’s constitutional 
role as the legislative designer of federal administration. 
First, it can acknowledge that the many accountability-
enhancing mechanisms that Congress attached to the 
CFPB bring it well within the constitutional mainstream 
and affirm the circuit court’s opinion. Second, it can 
remand the case for further review of these accountabil-
ity-enhancing mechanisms. A holistic review of the 
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CFPB’s structure will reveal the constitutional logic of 
Congress’s design. That record is not currently before 
the Court, and a remand would permit further review of 
these design features. What the Court should not do is 
accept Petitioner’s invitation to depart from the judicial 
lane and usurp Congress’s constitutional authority.  
ARGUMENT 
I. Institutional design is a highly political and 
legislative function. 
The Constitution grants substantial authority to 
Congress to design the institutions that exercise federal 
governmental power. Petitioner asks this Court to cir-
cumscribe that authority by eliminating single-director 
agencies with for-cause protection. The Court should 
decline: Doing so would place judges in the inappropri-
ately activist position of substituting their judgment for 
that of legislators in areas where policy—and politics—
must prevail. Petitioner’s request would freeze the ad-
ministrative state in a set of historically contingent insti-
tutional arrangements that are unmoored to any consti-
tutional text, unsupported by any scholarly theory of 
organizational design, and incapable of guaranteeing 
agency accountability. 
A. The Constitution vests Congress with broad 
authority to design agencies. 
The power of institutional design derives primarily 
from Article I’s Vesting Clause: “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the Unit-
ed States.” U.S. Const. Art. I § 1. The scope of this pro-
vision is mostly limited by Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers, but the Constitution provides more specific authori-
zation of power—and limits on that power—in Article 
II’s Appointments Clause, id. Art. II § 2 cl. 2. The Ap-
pointments Clause outlines who shall exercise govern-
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mental authority and through what process of appoint-
ment. Despite the Appointments Clause’s inclusion in 
Article II, the Constitution gives Congress a primary 
role in exercising that power: it is Congress’s authority 
to “establish[] by law” all “Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not . . . otherwise provided for” 
in the Constitution itself and to “vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as [Congress] think[s] proper.” Id. 
The President’s role is to “appoint” officers of the United 
States “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate.” Id.  
Beyond the text of the Constitution itself, this Court 
has also concluded that Congress’s expansive authority 
to engage in institutional design is limited by general 
principles of separation of powers. That is, Congress 
may not restrict the President’s executive authority 
unduly by creating institutions that are insufficiently 
connected to the President. The public must have “a 
clear and effective chain of command” between the insti-
tutions of Congress’s design and the President. Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 
U.S. 477, 498 (2010). Besides the Appointments Clause 
and general principles of separation of powers, Con-
gress’s authority to design the institutions that will carry 
out governmental policy is limited essentially only by its 
own enumerated powers. 
While the Constitution requires a sufficient modicum 
of accountability from regulatory agencies, it never spec-
ifies how this accountability may be achieved. Contrary 
to Petitioner’s contention that it requires either at-will 
removal or a multimember commission structure, the 
accountability analysis must be holistic and consider the 
totality of an agency’s features. The presence of one 
feature may offset another. Indeed, substantial variation 
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in agency structure already exists among agencies with 
for-cause removal protection—without raising general 
questions of constitutional validity. 
B. Congress has constantly experimented with 
agency design. 
From the Founding to the present, Congress has 
engaged in near constant experimentation with its sub-
stantial authority to design institutions of government. 
Take the Bank of the United States, one of the first 
instances of institutional design, which passed the First 
Congress at the behest of Alexander Hamilton. Congress 
endowed the Bank with important institutional details: 
that the President would appoint “not less than three” 
superintendents to oversee the bank’s initial capitaliza-
tion, Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 1, 1 Stat. 191, 191-92 
(amended 1791); that the Bank would have a president 
appointed by twenty-five directors, id. § 7; and that the 
directors would have a highly specific voting system, id.  
From an institutional design perspective, the Bank of the 
United States was highly specified.  
That novelty continued throughout the 19th century 
and beyond. The original Congress also created a cus-
toms service, a mint, a naval department, and the great 
departments of State, Treasury, the Attorney General, 
and many others. The watchword for the original Con-
gress and for its successors was the same: how to man-
age the vast apparatus that would govern this new na-
tion? Congress has responded to the call with true demo-
cratic experimentalism, striking out in multiple direc-
tions over history. See Jerry Mashaw, Creating The 
Administrative Constitution 34-35 (2012).  
In other words, novelty is not a constitutional enemy 
of the administrative state, but a constitutional invitation 
that Congress has accepted for over two centuries. Insti-
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tutions are designed in response to specific policy prob-
lems, and nearly every effort to design relevant institu-
tions is novel because of those unique circumstances. 
There is no off-the-shelf approach to the institutional 
design of the administrative state. Each institution—
from the Federal Reserve System to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) to the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA)—has its own bespoke design. See Kirti Datla & 
Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agen-
cies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769 
(2012). 
The freedom to experiment when designing the gov-
ernment is more than a policy choice by the Framers. It 
also reflects the reality that institutional design is a 
highly political process. The politics of the day determine 
which design features will attract support from enacting 
coalitions. The President has a role to play here, too: 
When design features are not to his liking, he may veto 
the sponsoring legislation and send it back to the Con-
gress to change the institution’s design, override his 
veto, or abandon the effort.  
This is not to say that the President’s ability to su-
pervise the executive and “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. Art. II § 3, does not 
matter in assessing Congress’s institutional design. It 
only means that the judiciary must not fetishize only one 
feature of institutional design among so many. The Con-
stitution grants the legislative power to Congress, and 
invites experimentation when designing the administra-
tive state. While that experimentation has some limits in 
the Appointments Clause and in ensuring that Congress 
does not encroach on executive authority, this Court has 
held for eighty years that requiring a good reason to fire 
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the head of an agency that exercises substantial legisla-
tive and adjudicative functions is not such an encroach-
ment. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602 (1935). This case presents that same, long-answered 
question over again. There is no reason for the Court to 
undertake the radical step of undermining the adminis-
trative state that Congress built in reliance on past prec-
edent. 
C. Congress regularly revisits and amends 
institutional design. 
Congress has not only used its expansive authority 
to design the structure of administrative government—it 
has also exercised oversight of those structures. While 
the separation of powers prevents Congress from usurp-
ing executive authority, evaluating the performance of 
administrative agencies and adjusting their institutional 
design in the face of changing politics and policy is also 
an important aspect of constitutional accountability over 
the administrative state.  
Examples of legislation that adjust agency design 
are legion. Congress creates agencies, Congress alters 
them, and Congress eliminates them. It is an oft-
repeated myth that “[o]nce an agency is established, its 
resources favor its own survival,” and it persists in im-
mortality. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism 309 
(1979). Yet Congress terminated more than half of ad-
ministrative agencies between 1946 and 1997. David E. 
Lewis, The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting 
the Myth of Agency Immortality, 64 J. Politics 89, 90 
(2002).  
Congress also amends existing institutions by alter-
ing their design. Two examples from financial regulation 
are worth highlighting because their unique institutional 
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structures are comparable to the CFPB: the Federal 
Reserve System and the regulation of federal thrifts. 
1. Congress and the Federal Reserve. The Federal 
Reserve System was created in 1913 as an answer to 
longstanding concerns about the fragility of the U.S. 
financial system. Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and 
Independence of the Federal Reserve 15-24 (2016). Orig-
inally, Congress created the “Federal Reserve System” 
to include a variety of administrative bodies, including: 
twelve Federal Reserve Banks, quasi-private institutions 
led by a “Governor” appointed by a board of directors 
with only tangential participation by politicians, Federal 
Reserve Act, Pub. L. 63-43, § 2, 38 Stat. 251 (1913); a 
“Federal Reserve Board,” chaired by the Secretary of 
the Treasury and with members appointed under the 
Appointments Clause, including the Comptroller of the 
Currency, id. § 10; and the Federal Advisory Council, or 
group of twelve private individuals selected by each 
Federal Reserve Bank to advise the Federal Reserve 
Board, id. § 12.  
Initially, Congress felt satisfied with this design, alt-
hough it added a member to the Federal Reserve Board 
in 1922. But in 1933 and especially in 1935, Congress 
substantially reorganized the system, largely to address 
concerns that the Fed had mishandled the Great De-
pression. It added a new agency, the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee, to coordinate monetary policy. It abol-
ished the Federal Reserve Board and organized in its 
place the “Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.” It created the modern structure of a Fed Chair 
and Vice Chair, while removing the President’s repre-
sentative from the Board.  
Congress has sustained near-constant attention to 
the Fed in the interim, making substantial changes to its 
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authorities (such as adding holding-company supervision 
to its duties in 1956) and structure (such as adding a 
second Vice Chair with responsibilities for bank supervi-
sion in 2010).  
2. The supervision of federal thrifts. Another exam-
ple is Congress’s approach to overseeing a special set of 
financial institutions that started as a creature of state 
law in the late 19th century: the building and loan associ-
ation. Beginning in 1933, the Homeowners Refinancing 
Act created a federal charter for federal savings-and-
loan associations. These would be overseen by two new 
federal entities: a regional Federal Home Loan Bank, 
overseen by a Chief Executive and board of directors, 
and a multimember agency, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (created in 1932 by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act). The Board was a five-member commission 
with a bipartisan balancing requirement. Pub. L. 72-304, 
47 Stat. 725, 736-37 (1932).  
After the 1980s “savings and loan” crisis, Congress 
further changed the institutional design of thrift charter 
and supervision by abolishing the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board and replacing it with the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS). Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, §§ 
301, 401, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). OTS was “an office of the 
Treasury” and “subject to the general oversight of the 
Secretary of the Treasury,” but the Secretary could not 
interfere with OTS affairs at will. See 12 U.S.C. § 1462a 
(1989) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may not inter-
vene in any matter or proceeding before the Director 
unless otherwise provided by law.”). 
Although OTS was designed to prevent future crises, 
Congress determined that OTS’s performance before the 
2008 crisis was a failure. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
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McCoy, The Subprime Virus 174-84 (2011). In 2010, 
Congress abolished OTS and placed most its functions 
within the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), with some going to the CFPB. 12 U.S.C. § 5412. 
These examples illustrate how attentive Congress is 
to its ongoing authority to redesign institutions of gov-
ernment to remain politically accountable. It is simply 
not the case that Congress creates institutions that con-
tinue to exist without accountability. Given how dynamic 
this process is, the Petitioner’s appropriate avenue to 
change the CFPB is Congress, not the courts. 
II. Congress has many routes for designing 
constitutionally accountable agencies. 
A. Federal agencies reflect tremendous diversity in 
design. 
There is substantial variation in federal agency 
structure, and there is no single paradigmatic agency. 
For example, some agencies are headed by a single 
director; others are led by multimember bodies. One 
study found that thirty-nine have single directors, while 
forty-three are multimember commissions. Datla & 
Revesz, Deconstructing, at 784. Examples of the former 
include the CFPB, the FHFA, the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA), and the OCC. Each head has a fixed 
term and may be removed by the President for cause. 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2 (OCC),  5491(c) (CFPB), 4512(b)(2) (FHFA); 
42 U.S.C. § 902 (SSA) .  
Among commissions, wide variation exists as to the 
number of members. Some have three members (e.g., 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), 12 
U.S.C. § 1752a), some five (e.g., Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)), some 
seven (e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
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(FRB), 12 U.S.C. § 242), and some eleven (e.g., the Post-
al Service, 39 U.S.C. § 202(a)).  
Among those agencies with boards, Congress has al-
so varied membership requirements, by including party-
affiliation requirements (e.g., SEC, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)) 
and varying lengths of terms (e.g., fourteen years for the 
FRB, 12 U.S.C. § 242; six years for NCUA, 7 U.S.C. § 
2(a)(2)(A)(ii)).  
Agencies also have different removal protections for 
their leaders. The statute governing the CFTC, for in-
stance, does not expressly prohibit at-will removal. 7 
U.S.C. § 2(a)(2). By contrast, Congress included some 
forms of explicit removal protection for other agencies, 
including the FRB, 12 U.S.C. § 242, and the FHFA, 12 
U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2), among others. 
Agencies also differ in other key respects, including 
how they are funded. Some agencies, like the SEC, re-
ceive funding primarily through congressional appropri-
ations. Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., 
Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Struc-
ture, Funding, and Other Issues 25 (2017). Others, like 
the OCC, are funded primarily by fees from regulated 
entities. Id. at 27-28. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) generates income through deposit 
insurance premiums, while the FRB derives its income 
primarily from securities purchased in the conduct of 
monetary policy. None is subject to congressional appro-
priations. Id. 
The design variations are myriad. Some agencies are 
“nested” within other agencies, like the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 28 U.S.C. § 531, and the OCC, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1. Others exist as public-private hybrids, like Amtrak, 
49 U.S.C. § 24301-02, and the Federal Open Market 
Committee, 12 U.S.C. § 263. 
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As these examples demonstrate, there is no standard 
paradigm of agency structure. The variation in agency 
structure reflects a long history of congressional exper-
imentation, as the Constitution permits. The structure of 
independent agencies is not set in stone—nor should it 
be. 
B. No single feature of an agency’s design 
determines agency accountability. 
The features examined above all affect the degree of 
agency insulation from presidential or partisan control. 
But few would urge the Court to cast in constitutional 
amber any one of these idiosyncratic policy choices. The 
Constitution assigns those choices to Congress to make, 
which it does in the context of particular agencies. The 
impact of Congress’s choices must be viewed holistically 
in the context of all of an agency’s features (not limited 
to those discussed above). No feature in isolation says 
anything about the agency’s overall constitutional ac-
countability. Some features may lessen accountability, 
but may be offset by other features that foster it. A 
holistic analysis is required to determine whether Con-
gress’s implementation of the Constitution’s expansive 
invitation to experiment has usurped presidential au-
thority. As explained below, the CFPB is not close to 
such a usurpation. 
C. Multimember commissions represent only one 
policy option for Congress; the Court should not 
fetishize them. 
The lack of any constitutional text addressing the 
minimum features necessary for agency accountability 
makes claims that agencies must all conform to litmus 
features all the more peculiar. See, e.g., Brief for Separa-
tion of Powers Scholars in Support of Petitioner 21-22.  
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Nor does the Court’s past precedent create grounds 
for such an artificial constraint upon Congress’s Article I 
power to design agencies. Scholars supporting Petitioner 
argue that:  
if the exception to the presidential removal power is 
to apply, it can only apply when all the factors sup-
plied by the Court in Humphrey’s Executor are pre-
sent. That includes a multimember body of “experts” 
from different political parties who are to be “non-
partisan” and act “impartially.”  
Id. at 22. Yet Humphrey’s Executor is in no way tied to 
these factors. The Federal Trade Commission Act did 
not mandate commissioner expertise or nonpartisanship 
or impartiality. Instead, Humphrey’s Executor stands on 
a separation of powers principle: that Congress in pro-
tection of its own legislative authority may reasonably 
limit the presidential removal power for agencies like the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (and the CFPB) that 
exercise substantial legislative and adjudicative powers. 
295 U.S. at 627-630.  
The fetishizing of commissions ignores the adjudica-
tive origins of commission structures, which may not be 
well-suited for rulemaking bodies. Ganesh Sitaraman & 
Ariel Dobkin, The Choice Between Single Director 
Agencies and Multimember Commissions, 71 Admin. L. 
Rev. 719, 755-58 (2019). More critically, the valorization 
of commissions misses that the fact that structuring an 
agency as a commission says nothing about the agency’s 
overall constitutional accountability. The decision to put 
a multimember structure at the top of an agency is only 
part of the political and policy calculus in agency design 
and says little about an agency’s insulation, politicization, 
or efficiency. Standing alone, the mere fact that an agen-
cy is a multimember commission is simply uninformative 
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about accountability.  There are numerous reasons to 
question whether multimember commissions foster 
accountability. Id. at 735-55.  
Some scholars and judges have argued that multi-
member commissions foster collegial decision-making, 
deliberation, and compromise. They do not. Commissions 
do not reliably produce compromise or check extreme 
policy positions. This is true for several reasons: partisan 
composition, quorum rules, horse-trading, and re-
strictions on private group deliberations by commission-
ers.  
In reality, the partisan majority of a bipartisan 
commission can usually out-vote the majority. While a 
new president cannot immediately overhaul a commis-
sion upon taking office, “presidents have been able to 
obtain majorities for their party on independent commis-
sions within 13-14 months after taking office from a prior 
President of a different party.” Rachel E. Barkow, Insu-
lating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 38 (2010). Further, a partisan 
requirement does not guarantee policy stability. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that multimember agencies can be 
partisan and unbalanced in their decision-making, and 
that “during periods of divided government, partisan-
line voting increases and members in the minority dis-
sent more.” Datla & Revesz, Deconstructing, at 796. 
Some commentators assert that accountability de-
rives from gaining the support of a bare majority of 
commission members. But because of majority rule, 
commission structures are unlikely to be a meaningful 
check on abuse of power. A real check on independent 
agency overreach is judicial review of agency actions for 
arbitrary and capricious behavior—not a commission 
structure. Indeed, were it otherwise, courts would never 
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have cause to strike down the actions of commissions as 
arbitrary and capricious.  
Commissions all have quorum requirements, but 
they are frequently created through agency regulation 
rather than by statute. Absent a statute or rule requiring 
multiple members for a quorum, even a nominally mul-
timember commission could function with just one ap-
pointed member. Thus, “[i]n the absence of a statutory 
requirement to the contrary, a five-person agency with a 
three-person quorum can make decisions on a 2–1 basis 
or even a 3–0 basis—potentially undermining the exist-
ence of ideological diversity among the members.” Si-
taraman & Dobkin, The Choice, at 748. 
This is hardly speculative. Term expirations, resig-
nations, disability, and death can all leave commissions 
short-handed because the Federal Vacancies Reform Act 
does not apply to independent commissions. 5 U.S.C. § 
3349c(1). Indeed, the average tenure of a political ap-
pointee is only two-and-a-half years. James P. Pfiffner et 
al., Strong Executive Branch Leadership Crucial for 
Policy Implementation, Pub. Manager, Winter 2012, at 
37, 38 (2012). This has prevented some commissions, 
such as the National Labor Relations Board, from mak-
ing collective decisions for lack of a quorum. See, e.g., 
Hosp. of Barstow, Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 440, 441 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). A multimember commission is no guarantee 
of compromise when the commission cannot muster a 
quorum.  
Commissions also provide no guarantee against ex-
treme policy positions given the possibility of horse-
trading among members. In the jargon of game theory, 
commissions don’t operate as single-stage, one-shot 
games, but as multi-stage, repeat games. This opens the 
door to complex deal-making—a commission member 
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might trade her vote on one issue in exchange for a vote 
on another. Thus, instead of two moderate outcomes, a 
commission could also produce two (disparate) extreme 
policy results. Barkow, Insulating Agencies, at 20. 
The idea that commissions foster compromise also 
ignores the Government in Sunshine Act, which requires 
that discussions among more than two commissioners be 
held in public. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b). This open-meeting 
requirement effectively precludes frank and deliberative 
discussion among members and impedes negotiated 
compromises. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 595 (1984); Sitaraman & 
Dobkin, The Choice, at 745-47.  
In short, a multimember commission—one of the 
two agency structures that Petitioner believes is consti-
tutionally permissible—has no necessary connection with 
accountability. The proper inquiry is not whether an 
agency has a particular feature—an at-will removal or 
commission structure—but whether the sum total of all 
of its features, taken together, make it sufficiently ac-
countable. The CFPB readily does. While the CFPB has 
a unique constellation of regulatory design features, they 
reflect thinking about how to minimize regulatory cap-
ture and how to protect against presidential manipula-
tion of the economy for short-term political gain. 
III. The CFPB is subject to numerous accountability 
mechanisms. 
A. Accountability concerns animated the CFPB’s 
design. 
1.  The CFPB was created in response to the lack of 
accountability of other agencies for consumer financial 
protection. The legislative history shows that Congress’s 
central concern in creating the CFPB was to ensure 
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public accountability in overseeing consumer-financial 
protection. Before the CFPB’s creation, consumer finan-
cial protection had been fragmented among a dozen 
federal agencies: five bank regulators, the FTC, the 
FHFA, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Depart-
ments of Defense, Education, Housing and Urban De-
velopment, and Veterans Affairs. Adam J. Levitin, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduc-
tion, 32 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. Services L. 321, 327-
28 (2013). This diffusion of consumer financial protection 
meant that no single agency bore responsibility for regu-
lating core consumer financial markets like deposits, 
mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, payday loans, and 
debt collection. 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, some of these 
agencies were perceived as having been “asleep at the 
wheel” in part because of structural problems that made 
consumer financial protection subordinate to the agen-
cies’ other missions as well as some agencies beholden to 
the financial services industry for their funding. See 
Engel & McCoy, Subprime Virus, at 151-223; Levitin, 
The CFPB, at 328-34. These concerns animated the 
creation of the CFPB, which consolidated the consumer 
financial protection mission in a single agency, equipped 
with adequate statutory authority and independent 
funding. 
2. Congress was particularly concerned about regu-
latory capture. In designing the CFPB, Congress was 
concerned about a particular accountability problem—
“regulatory capture”—in which agencies favor the inter-
ests of regulated industries over those of the public. 
Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation 
and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Es-
say, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 2042 (2014). Capture con-
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cerns were expressly mentioned in a Treasury white 
paper setting out the Obama Administration’s reasons 
for creating the CFPB, which argued that the wrong 
funding structure could “lead to regulatory capture.” 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Re-
form: A New Foundation 29 (2009). The paper according-
ly proposed that the CFPB be “an independent agency 
with stable, robust funding” that is not subject to appro-
priations. Id. at 14. The need to devise a structure im-
mune from regulatory capture informed Congress’s 
design of the CFPB. 
3. The CFPB’s design reflects a concern about regu-
latory capture. The regulatory-capture concern is re-
flected most notably in three key features of the CFPB’s 
design: non-appropriated funding; a for-cause removal 
standard; and a single director. Regulatory capture 
operates in many ways, but a key mechanism is through 
agency funding. Agencies that are dependent on regulat-
ed industries for funding may seek to curry favor with 
their regulatory charges. This dynamic was a major 
criticism of various federal bank regulators before Dodd-
Frank. For example, the OCC and the OTS were both 
funded by the institutions they regulated. They attempt-
ed to win charters by engaging in a race to the bottom on 
consumer protection and other regulatory oversight. 
Levitin, The CFPB. 
Relatedly, regulated industries are likely to bring 
concentrated political pressure to bear on the White 
House to influence an agency whose head is subject to 
at-will removal, in order to adjust policy in favor of the 
industry. The CFPB’s for-cause removal standard is 
designed to shield against such favoritism.   
The CFPB’s single-director structure also reflects a 
concern about capture. Earlier proposals for the CFPB 
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contemplated a bipartisan commission or a non-partisan 
board. During the legislative process, Congress ultimate-
ly decided on a single-director structure precisely to 
enhance agency accountability. With one director, it is 
clear who is responsible for the agency’s actions: The 
colloquial buck stops with that one person. In contrast, 
multimember commissions diffuse accountability, allow-
ing members to point fingers at each other and plead the 
necessity of cutting deals as ways of shirking accounta-
bility.  
A single-director structure also protects against cap-
ture by preventing regulated industries from using 
quorum requirements to hold up agency action. Regulat-
ed industries can paralyze commissions from acting by 
exerting political pressure to delay or hold up confirma-
tion of enough members to permit a quorum. A single-
director structure is less vulnerable to this sort of delay 
because when there is a vacancy, its organic statute or 
the Vacancies Reform Act provides for it to be filled 
without congressional action, thereby enabling the agen-
cy to continue exercising its full powers.  
Finally, the single-director structure made it easier 
to launch the CFPB. It took a substantial amount of time 
for the Senate to confirm the CFPB’s first Director. It is 
far easier to confirm a single director than to confirm 
multiple commission members. In the contemporary 
political environment, a single-director structure was 
essential for making sure that the CFPB could com-
mence operations in a timely fashion, thereby ensuring 
that the agency would be accountable to Congress in 
fulfilling its policy mission.  
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B. The CFPB is subject to a battery of 
accountability measures. 
Congress’s deliberate choice in designing the CFPB 
to avoid capture does not mean that the agency was left 
unaccountable. Quite the opposite. The CFPB is “a 
unique package of agency checks and balances that does 
not track with pre-existing agency forms.” Levitin, Fi-
nancial Regulation, at 2057. It “represents an attempt to 
balance oversight with sufficient political insulation to 
avoid the problem of agency capture via internalization 
of legislative capture.” Id.  
The CFPB is subject to robust accountability mech-
anisms. They are carefully calibrated with broader policy 
objectives: Congress prioritized “programmatic account-
ability” to meet the “the substantive goals of consumer 
financial protection” over “accountability to current 
national political leaders.” Gillian E. Metzger, Through 
the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving 
Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial 
Regulation, 78 Law and Contemp. Probs. 129, 148 (2015).  
1. The CFPB is accountable to Congress and the 
President first and foremost through the oversight pro-
cess. The CFPB Director is required to appear twice a 
year before the Senate Banking Committee and the 
House Committees on Financial Services and Energy 
and Commerce, 12 U.S.C. § 5496(a). In advance, the 
CFPB must submit to the Committees and the President 
a comprehensive report on topics ranging from regulato-
ry obstacles and objectives to budgetary justifications, as 
well as analysis of past and anticipated agency actions. 
Id. § 5496(b)-(c). The CFPB is also subject to an annual 
audit by the Government Accountability Office, and full 
review by the Federal Reserve’s Inspector General. Id. § 
5496a; 5 U.S.C. App. § 8G(a)(2). Congress can, of course, 
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undertake additional oversight of the CFPB, and Con-
gress has been anything but lax in this regard. In its first 
five years, CFPB officials testified before Congress over 
sixty times and responded to numerous document re-
quests. See CFPB, Factsheet: Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau By the Numbers (2016), 
http://bit.ly/2olQFUz.  
2. Ultimately, if enough members of Congress do 
not approve of the CFPB’s actions, they can reform the 
agency through legislation. Congressional oversight 
combined with the regular legislative process imposes a 
critical measure of accountability on the CFPB.  
3. Some have argued that the CFPB is not subject 
to Congress’s power of the purse because it is not subject 
to annual appropriations. That mistakes annual appro-
priations as Congress’s sole means of exercising the 
power of the purse. 
Congress does not control the budgets of any other 
federal bank regulator. It does not appropriate funds for 
the FRB, the OCC, the FDIC, the NCUA, or FHFA. 
Instead, these agencies by law all have their own inde-
pendent revenue streams from chartering, insurance 
assessments, or earnings on their holdings, and set their 
own budgets independently from the President or Con-
gress.  
In contrast to all the other bank regulators, the 
CFPB’s budget is capped by statute at 12% of the Fed-
eral Reserve System’s fiscal year 2009 annual operating 
budget, subject to inflation adjustment. 12 U.S.C. § 5497. 
This generally puts a hard ceiling on the CFPB’s activi-
ties. No such cap exists for any other non-appropriated 
federal financial regulator. In other words, Congress still 
exercises budgetary control over the CFPB—something 
it does not do for any other bank regulator. 
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More broadly, most federal spending today is not set 
through annual appropriations, but rather through a 
wide variety of permanent funding mechanisms. See 
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: 2017 to 2027, at 12-14 (2017). It would be odd 
indeed if annual appropriations were now held to be a 
constitutional requirement for accountability. 
4. Beyond being answerable to Congress through 
the legislative process and a capped budget, the CPFB is 
subject to a wide array of other accountability mecha-
nisms. CFPB rulemakings—unlike those of any other 
regulator—are subject to veto by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council. 12 U.S.C. § 5513. CFPB enforcement 
actions are subject to judicial review. Id. § 5563. Its 
rulemakings and adjudications are subject to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59. And lastly, 
the CFPB is subject to explicit statutory requirements 
to engage in cost-benefit analysis. Id. § 5512. Viewed 
holistically, then, the CFPB represents a constitutionally 
permissible and effective experiment in agency design.  
IV. Congress insulates financial agencies including the 
CFPB from politics to ensure economic safety and 
stability.  
Petitioner asks the Court to overrule Humphrey’s 
Executor and cause all independent agency heads—
single directors and multimember commissions alike—to 
serve at-will. Pet. Br. 3. Nothing in the text of the Con-
stitution mandates such a result. Whatever the wisdom 
of such a structure generally, there are unique and over-
riding considerations for insulating financial regulators 
from at-will termination. If this Court invalidates for-
cause removal, it will destroy one of Congress’s most 
important policy tools in the regulation of the economy: 
forcing politicians and regulators to take a long-term 
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view of the nation’s economic, financial, and monetary 
stability. Without for-cause removal protection, the 
partisan and electoral disputes of the day will drive fi-
nancial and monetary policy—a concern to which Con-
gress has been attuned since the Founding—and Presi-
dents would be free to threaten removal to stoke the 
economy for short-term political gain, at the expense of 
economic stability.  
For-cause removal, especially in the realm of finan-
cial and economic regulation, is thus a key and enduring 
feature of congressional experimentation. It permits a 
balance between granting presidents the power of ap-
pointment and limiting a President bent on producing a 
short-term, unsustainable boom contra congressional 
policy. A constitutional ruling stripping financial regula-
tors of for-cause protection would put the nation’s econ-
omy at risk every election cycle and is inconsistent with 
the Constitutional purpose of “promot[ing] the general 
welfare.” 
A. Credit-fueled asset bubbles are the leading 
cause of financial crises. 
When Presidents lean on financial regulators to bol-
ster their political prospects, the result is primarily to 
loosen credit to fuel spending and a booming economy. 
As alluring as this temptation is, Congress has for dec-
ades opted to temper it because loosening credit can 
result in reckless lending that threatens financial stabil-
ity. A short-term, but unsustainable credit-fueled asset 
bubble can result in a subsequent debilitating economic 
crash. History has shown that the worst financial crises 
for centuries have been caused by real estate bubbles 
financed by loose credit. Carmen M. Reinhart & Ken-
neth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different xliv–xlv, 158–62 
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(2009). The 2008 financial crisis is the latest troubling 
reminder.  
B. Financial regulators control key congressional 
priorities in lending and credit expansion  
In part to ensure accountability and the decentrali-
zation of power throughout the administrative state, 
Congress has delegated the control of credit expansion 
to a variety of institutions, including the FRB, the SEC, 
and the CFPB. For this reason, federal financial regula-
tors do not serve at the pleasure of the President, no 
matter the other details of agency structure. Hogue et 
al., Independence of Federal Financial Regulators 16-19 
& tbl. 4. 
1. Congress delegated monetary policy to the Fed-
eral Reserve. Monetary policy is the domain of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. By law, the Federal Reserve must 
conduct monetary policy “to promote . . . maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 
rates.” 12 U.S.C. § 225a. Monetary policy addresses 
these objectives by managing the money supply and 
interest rates.  
 The Federal Reserve has several monetary tools 
at its disposal. Its main tool consists of moving the target 
for the federal funds rate (which is the interest rate that 
banks pay to borrow reserve balances overnight). The 
Federal Reserve moves this rate by purchasing and 
selling U.S. government securities through open market 
operations. FRB, The Federal Reserve System—
Purposes & Functions 21-22 (10th ed. 2016). 
To stimulate demand for goods and services, the 
Federal Reserve can cut the federal funds rate, causing 
short-term interest rates to fall and credit to expand. 
Conversely, if demand overheats, the Federal Reserve 
can ease inflationary pressures by raising that rate. 
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Since 2008, the Federal Reserve has added other mone-
tary tools with the same objective: to stabilize demand 
and, with it, prices and employment. Id. 
Cognizant of these stimulus powers, Presidents have 
incentives to pressure the Federal Reserve to cut inter-
est rates to improve their political prospects. The Consti-
tution grants the President important power to influence 
that policy through his appointment power, an ability 
that every President in the Fed’s history has exercised. 
Conti-Brown, Power and Independence, at 185-87. But 
Congress restricts the President’s influence over day-to-
day monetary policy by protecting those presidential 
appointees from immediate dismissal. Without that pro-
tection, the Fed’s autonomy to pursue Congress’s objec-
tives would be all but eliminated.  
2. The White House can also push for lax credit by 
pressuring federal financial regulators. Monetary policy 
is just one area of economic policy that Congress has 
sought to insulate from the President’s day-to-day influ-
ence over credit expansion. The President may also lean 
on a host of federal financial regulators to expand credit 
through deregulation of lending standards. 
Over the years, Congress created multiple federal 
financial regulators and entrusted each with duties for 
the regulation of credit. Foremost are the three pruden-
tial bank regulators (the FRB, the FDIC and the OCC), 
who oversee the solvency of insured depository institu-
tions. Keith R. Fisher, Banking Law Manual: Federal 
Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, Banks and 
Thrifts § 2.02[2][b][ii] (Matthew Bender, 2d ed. 2019). To 
safeguard solvency, all three regulators administer stat-
utes and rules that affect the supply and terms of loans 
by banks and thrifts. These include lending limits and 
other credit regulations, capital adequacy requirements 
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and liquidity standards. Id. §§ 6.03-6.05. The FRB has 
added responsibilities for credit regulation in supervis-
ing financial stability and depository institution holding 
companies. Id. §§ 2.03[3][c][iii], [v], 4.03, 4.07[6]. 
Other federal financial regulators exercise special-
ized oversight of consumer lending. The CFPB regulates 
market conduct for consumer finance and is the only 
federal agency that regulates the residential mortgage 
lending system in its entirety. Patricia A. McCoy & 
Susan M. Wachter, The Macroprudential Implications of 
the Qualified Mortgage Debate, 83 J. L. & Contemp. 
Probs. pt. VII (forthcoming 2020). The FTC and the 
CFPB share enforcement for consumer protection viola-
tions by nonbank lenders. Levitin, The CFPB, at 357, 
361. Meanwhile, FHFA supervises the federal mortgage 
guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fisher § 
2.06[4]. In overseeing the mortgage market, these agen-
cies affect the ease of obtaining mortgages and thus their 
supply. See, e.g., McCoy & Wachter, Macroprudential 
Implications, pt. III; FHFA, 2018 Annual Report to 
Congress 6, 37-49 (2019).  
Finally, capital markets regulators exert a critical 
effect on the supply of capital for lending. The SEC does 
so as the lead regulator for asset-backed securitizations 
and corporate debt issuances. The SEC and the CFTC 
also share oversight of credit default swaps, which pro-
tect bond investors from defaults. CFTC, FY 2019 Agen-
cy Financial Report 10, 12-13, 111 (2019); SEC, The 
Regulatory Regime for Security-Based Swaps 3 (2013). 
In each case, Congress has balanced the constitu-
tional requirement that the President take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed with the need to shield credit 
and monetary expansion from political interference. 
Protection from at-will termination has been Congress’s 
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preferred mechanism to achieve this balance for over a 
century. For-cause removal’s impact on agency account-
ability does not depend on a multimember commission 
structure—multimember commissions do not inherently 
add anything to accountability and may in fact lessen it. 
Thus the firstborn of federal financial regulators, the 
OCC, has a single director with for-cause removal pro-
tection as well as additional statutory protection against 
political interference by the President. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1(b), 
2.  
In short, a ruling stripping the CFPB Director of 
for-cause protection could destabilize lending. A ruling 
overturning Humphrey’s Executor would expose all 
federal financial regulators to the same disastrous pres-
sure. 
Concerns about presidential pressure on financial 
regulators to deregulate lending are by no means hypo-
thetical. Over the last eighteen months, President Don-
ald Trump has publicly blasted the Federal Reserve in 
interviews and on Twitter, including twenty-five times in 
the month of August. His criticism was exactly as Con-
gress predicted: to slash interest rates to “ZERO, or 
less,” criticizing Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell 
for his “naïveté . . .” Kate Davidson & Catherine Lucey, 
Trump Says Fed Should Cut Rates to ‘Zero, or Less,’ 
Attacks Jerome Powell Again, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 2019; 
Howard Schneider, ‘Boneheads’ no more? Fed’s rate 
cuts appear to defuse Trump’s Twitter rage, Reuters, 
Dec. 12, 2019. President Trump has even reportedly 
considered removing Chairman Powell from his position 
because of dissatisfaction with Federal Reserve mone-
tary policy, but concluded that Congress’s for-cause 
removability protection for the Fed likely prevents him 
from doing so. Saleha Mohsin et al., Trump Asked White 
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House Lawyers for Options on Removing Powell, 
Bloomberg, June 18, 2019. This nation’s history is re-
plete with similar instances of presidential efforts to 
muscle financial regulators, reaching the same legal 
conclusion. Kevin Granville, A President at War With 
His Fed Chief, 5 Decades Before Trump, N.Y. Times, 
June 13, 2017 (discussing Lyndon Johnson’s desire to 
fire Fed Chair William McChesney Martin). History is 
clear: Congress is closely attuned to the constitutional 
demands of presidential prerogatives of influencing 
policy through the appointment power while also insulat-
ing financial regulatory agencies from day-to-day politi-
cal interference. For-cause removability protection is the 
center of that balancing act.  
V. This case is not an appropriate vehicle for 
addressing whether “for cause” removal places a 
material limitation on the President’s powers. 
Congress maintains substantial political freedom to 
experiment with optimal agency design and the Consti-
tution’s text fails to provide any objective metric for 
evaluating the permissibility of Congress’s choices in this 
instance. The Constitution no more petrifies the regula-
tory state in the form of multimember commissions than 
it precludes the regulatory state altogether. Moreover, 
financial regulatory agencies present unique concerns 
about manipulation by the President for his own political 
benefit that counsel for-cause removal insulation as a 
way of ensuring economic stability and the public wel-
fare. Accordingly, Congress should have extra latitude 
regarding the design of financial regulatory agencies 
because presidential abuse could undermine the entire 
constitutional system by enabling a President to effec-
tively “buy” elections through easy credit.  
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If the Court is still concerned whether the President 
has sufficient ability to supervise the CPFB, we would 
urge the Court to begin its inquiry as Judge Griffith did. 
PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 124. The initial inquiry must be: 
“How difficult is it for the President to remove the Di-
rector?” Id. To the extent that the Court determines that 
the statutory “for cause” removal standard in 12 U.S.C. § 
5491(c)(3) does not present an impermissible obstacle to 
the President’s duty to “take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed,” there is no need to address the broader 
and perilous constitutional questions about whether for-
cause removal is ever permitted or whether it is only 
permitted for multimember agencies. That modest ap-
proach is compelled by the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance and by what the Chief Justice has called “the 
cardinal principal of judicial restraint—if it is not neces-
sary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” 
PDK Labs, Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
While we believe that an inquiry beginning with the 
scope of the statutory provision is the proper route for 
the Court to pursue, and also believe that “for cause” 
removal is consistent with ensuring “faithful execu-
tion”—that is, good-faith performance—of the laws, this 
case does not provide a proper vehicle for determining 
the scope of “for cause” removal power because there is 
no case or controversy regarding the application of that 
clause. No attempt has been made by the President to 
remove the CFPB Director. Instead, this case is about 
the CFPB’s ability to enforce a civil investigatory de-
mand (not even signed by the Director) against a private 
entity that has no interest in whether the Director is in 
fact removable only for cause. While the scope of “for 
cause” dismissal is an important question, it is one that is 
depends on the specific statutory text and which should 
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only be addressed when it is actually litigated. We there-
fore urge the Court to dismiss certiorari as improvident-
ly granted and await a case where there is a genuine 
conflict between a President and an appointee about a 
statutory “for cause” removal provision.  
If the Court does not dismiss this case, there are two 
alternative paths the Court may take to ensure that 
Congress retains its role as the Constitution’s chief insti-
tutional designer of the administrative state. First, it 
may affirm the lower court’s opinion, given the substan-
tial accountability that the CFPB has to democratic and 
constitutional processes. Second, it may remand the case 
to the lower courts to render a holistic analysis of the 
design features of the CFPB. The Court should decline 
Petitioner’s invitation to curtail Congress’s constitutional 
authority to design the institutions of the federal gov-
ernment.  
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should dismiss certio-
rari as improvidently granted.  In the alternative, the 
Court should either hold that the CFPB’s structure is 
constitutional or remand for further consideration. 
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